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BOOK REVIEWS
The Federal Income Tax.
By Roy G. and GLADYS C.
York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1940. Pp. xvii, 640.

BLAKEY.

New

This book is primarily an economic and social history of the federal income
tax. Changes in legislation are noted and legal issues receive attention
but the emphasis throughout is on the background from which these changes
come, or against which they and related matters may be perceived. Thus
the income tax is viewed not as a finished instrument, and perhaps as one
never to be completed but always in the making.
To the preparation of this work, the authors brought the accumulated
knowledge of long study not exclusively beside the lamp. They have lived
in Washington at various periods for a total of several years, and thereby
became acquainted with the important political and administration leaders
who have played parts in the development of the income tax. Secretary
Cordell Hull, who, according to the authors, "has probably done more than
any living man to establish and develop a good income tax in the United
States," was especially helpful. Indeed, it appeared at one time that he
might collaborate in writing the book. Judge Green, for a long time Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, and W. T. Sherwood gave much
assistance. Guy T. Helvering, Roswell Magill, Arthur Kent, L. H. Parker,
Colin Stain, and many other persons of prominence in taxation also provided information. Evidence of the long continued interest of the authors
in the problems examined in this book is afforded by numerous articles on.
federal income taxation. Since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment,
Professor Blakey either individually or in collaboration with Mrs. Blakey
has discussed each federal revenue act in the pages of the American Economic
Review.
The first two chapters of the book give the background to the income
tax measure of 1913. Inasmuch as their content is of special importance,
it will be reviewed here at some length. The personal income tax, viewed
by the authors as a revolution in national taxation, sprang from the equalitarian movement generated by the long depression that began in the seventies.
The difficulties of the farmers in the South and West led them not only
to favor greenbacks and free silver but also to advocate income taxation.
The Greenback, Anti-monopoly, and Populist Parties all favored such a tax.
Out of this ferment of political pressure came many bills. Indeed, from 1874
to 1893, one or more bills for income tax legislation were introduced at
practically every session of Congress. The authors of these bills were invariably from the South and the West. The first prominent Easterner to
favor income taxation was Joseph Pulitzer, who included the taxation of
large incomes as part of his program for The World.
All this agitation bore fruit in the income tax act of 1894. It was a period
of depression following the panic of 1893, and the Treasury was in need
of money. President Cleveland was opposed to an income tax but his party
was committed to a reduction in the tariff, thus making this need more acute.
In this emergency, William J. Bryan, who had made a study of the income
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tax and who was then serving as a member of the Committee on Ways
and Means, exerted his influence in support of the income tax. He was
seconded by Representative Hall of Missouri who, though not a member of
the Committee, influenced it by his arguments and by presenting petitions
from state delegations. Under the rallying cry "Vote for free sugar and
an income tax" both measures were passed. They were linked because with
sugar on the free list, the need for a revenue measure was great.
Following the invalidation of the tax in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and
Trust Company,' economic conditions improved and interest in the passage
of income tax legislation declined though it never wholly subsided. In 1906
support for such a measure came from an unexpected source. President
Theodore Roosevelt, in speaking at the laying of the corner stone of the
House Office Building, urged strongly the enactment of graduated income
and inheritance taxes. In 1907, Cordell Hull, a Representative from Tennessee, introduced a bill for an income tax and endeavored to educate Congress
concerning this impost.
The campaign of 1908 was mainly on the issue of tariff reform, and with
the victory of the Republicans, conservatism appeared firmly established.
Speaker Cannon presided over the House with a none too gentle hand, and
the leaders in key positions, including the chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means, were all "standpatters." But in advocating increased
tariff rates, they overreached themselves and stirred up much opposition in
the ranks of their members in Congress and in the country at large. The
determined fight of the insurgents against the reactionaries of the party
began. In this struggle the issue of the income tax got an inning, and
eventually President Taft thought it well to propose a compromise: an excise
tax of 1 per cent on the income of corporations, and a joint resolution for
an amendment to the constitution giving the federal government power
to levy an income tax without apportionment among the states.
This move by the President appealed to the conservatives of his party
because they thought it harmless. Their belief 'that the amendment would
not be ratified was shared by such prominent liberals as Senators La Follette
and Cummins. The Progressives could not, however, oppose the compromise because it went part way with their views. The Democrats, having
urged enactment of an income tax, were likewise not in a position to oppose
the President's plan. The excise on corporate earnings was enacted, the
resolution was passed, the amendment was adopted, and thus the thin wedge
of the income tax entered the federal revenue structure.
The first personal income tax measure passed under the authority of the
amendment, was linked, like its predecessors, the income tax act of 1894
and the excise of 1909 on corporation income, to changes in the tariff. The
income tax was proposed to make up for revenue lost by a reduction in
the rates of the tariff. Representative Cordell Hull was assigned the task
of writing the bill. To this work he brought to bear the results of a careful
study of foreign income taxes, particularly the British. The idea of collection at the source appealed particularly to him and led him to favor a flat
rate of taxation. In this he was opposed by Representative Garner who
1157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
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advocated the levy of the tax at graduated rates. The system of individual
reporting was adopted in the final measure, and the tax was laid at graduated rates.
In discussing this and other revenue measures, the original bills in the
House and Senate, the conference reports, and finally the resulting legislation are all examined with such sidelights from the political or economic
situation as are needed for comprehension'of the issues involved. The names
of the members of important committees are given, and characterizations of
leading figures are made. Thus the reader comes to feel that he is present
at the making of income tax law.
The last four of the twenty-four chapters examine the evolution of the
definition of taxable income, rates and exemptions, the problem of administration, and the conclusions that may be drawn respecting the income tax.
The treatment here as elsewhere is in the historical emphasis, for the income
tax is viewed as part and parcel of modem industrial civilization and its
development as parallel to that of civilization as a whole.
This is a work of depth and breadth, indispensable to those who seek
understanding of the extraordinary changes that have come in federal taxation since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment.
M. Slade Kendrick.*
Ithaca, New York.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, American Judge. By GEORGE S. HELLMAN. New
York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1940. Pp.
ix, 339.
Some of the books on Cardozo show him as the legal machine. In this
one the Judge is dwelt upon, but Mr. Hellman is at pains to show us the
human Cardozo. He goes back to the distinguished ancestry for the roots
of a personality, which, as Mr. Hellman unfolds it, is full of charm. The
name Cardozo indicates the Spanish-Portuguese source of the family, but,
via England, it was early in the New World. The clan fought in our American Revolution and its members were part of old New York. Proud in
their hearts, they were proudest of their brains and their culture. The
child grew up among highly literate family contacts and, curiously enough,
under the tutorship of Horatio Alger-he of the onward and upward books.
At ten "Master Ben" was writing boyish poetry which Mr. Hellman reproduces. At fourteen the boy was ready for entrance to Columbia College,
then without its present population and located on Madison Avenue. His
life of expiation had already begun. He was a too earnest student. His boyhood, in the ordinary sense of boyhood, was like the snakes of Ireland, but
Mr. Hellman by various anecdotes establishes that "Ben" was well beloved
among his contemporaries. At his commencement the nineteen year old
Cardozo was first orator, speaking on "The Altruist in Politics." Photographs show him a beautiful baby, a winsome little boy, a handsome young
man; and, as we know, his good looks stayed with him. Cardozo's law
*Professor of Public Finance, Cornell University.
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training at Columbia Mr. Hellman merely flits over.' "In the School of
Law he had a two year course, which he did not complete." Cardozo at
the bar gets little of Mr. Hellman's attention although his subject "for
more than a score of years toiled in his law offices." During these years
Cardozo established the tradition of the gentle hermit devoted to "work,
work, work." This he carried over into the judicial career, on which Mr.
Hellman chiefly dwells. One morning, I myself saw the Judge climbing
the hill at Albany. It was 6:45 a.m. but he was on his way to his office.
Mr. Hellman has undertaken to show the human side and he succeeds. One
realizes the attractive lovableness of the man as well as the greatness of
the Judge. But I confess to feeling sorry that such a fine fellow seems
to have had so little fun out of life. Cardozo at play is a theme which
apparently was not sounded often. No doubt he drew his satisfaction out
of making the second justice Cardozo so fragrant a memory that the first
is forgotten.
G. H. Robinson.*
Ithaca,New York
Encyclopedia of Corporate Forms, vol. IV. Prepared by the Editorial
Staff of Prentice-Hall, Inc. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1940. Pp.
xli, 1269.
The December, 1939, issue of the QUARTERLY reviewed Volume III of the
present series, which covered Merger, Consolidation, Leases and several other
topics. Since an explanation was given at that time of the general scope of
the series and of the editorial methods employed, there is perhaps no need
to go into detail regarding the volume in hand. The subjects here covered
are Reorganization (162 pages, 93 forms); Trust Indentures and Other
Borrowing Agreements (268 pages, 24 forms); Resolutions and Notices
relating to Borrowing (286 pages, 216 forms); and Statutory Forms for
the various states (444 pages, 371 forms). Such of the forms as this
reviewer has read appear to have been carefully prepared. The typography,
arrangement and indexing are excellent. There seem to be, however, a
substantial number of items differing from one another only in minor respects, or dealing with situations which only rarely arise.
Several complete trust indentures are given, including one which runs to
92 pages.- Other long forms supplied are protective committee deposit agreement (13 pages), and several plans of reorganization and reorganization
agreements.
A large section of the book is given over to Statutory Forms. These
are not limited to forms whose exact wording is prescribed by statute; they
include for each state, with the exception of those which themselves supply
official forms on request, a group of instruments complying with basic statutory requirements. This group generally comprises the certificate of incorporation and other organization forms, as well as forms relating to amendment-of the certificate, consolidation, merger, and dissolution. The New
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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York section, for example, covers 39 pages and includes 28 of these basic
forms. To include so many forms of this nature in a permanent volume
seems rather an expensive luxury, since statutory changes during the coming
years will probably render obsolete a large number of them. The editors'
plan, however, called for completeness, and that goal has certainly been
achieved.
George T. Washington.*
ithaca,New York.

Law as Logic and Experience. By
versity Press. 1940. Pp. ix, 164.

MAX RADiN.

New Haven: Yale Uni-

The five chapters of this little volume constitute, in the main, the Storrs
Lectures which were recently delivered at the Yale Law School. Their
1
message is symbolized by that famous pronouncement of Holmes, "The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Their reception by
the profession will be welcomed as a systematic exposition by one of the

pioneer realists. 2 Nearly a decade ago Radin was prominent among the
twenty who were designated by Llewellyn as notably realistic in their legal
thought.3 More recently Llewellyn has placed him in a more select group
4
The title of the
of four writers who have come in for few "drubbings."
volume is an appropriate tribute to Holmes, who has so often been acclaimed
the forerunner of the American realistic movement.
5
In the Preface, the author advises the reader that he does not intend
to strike a middle course between "conceptualism" and "realism." "If 'conceptualism' were recognized for what it is, an inescapable form of the
language of the law, it could do little harm." If that is true, then there
is no middle course. The question is merely one of a well adjusted interrelation. That would seem to make the problem one of semantics.
8
The author exemplifies the value of the resources of diction in law by
definite
for
the
is
substituted
article
suggesting that when the indefinite
article, "the law" becomes "a law" and one descends "into the piffling
particularity of ephemeral statute." When the law deals with experience, it
7
The marginal experience
must use the word which symbolizes experience.
in which the law lives is social experience. The artificial notions that the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1

HoL s, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 1.
2"I profess the faith of realism and cannot imagine a legal theory that is not first of
all poncerned with a disposition of relations between man and man in an actual case."
On Legal Scholarship (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1124, 1138.
Radin,
3
Llewellyn, Sonte Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound (1931) 44
L. Rav. 1222, 1227.
Hav.
4
Lewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence (1940) 26 A. B. A. J.
300, 307.
5P. vi.
6p. 5.
7p. 25.
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law sees man qua citizen or man qua father, as subjects of rights and duties
and existing only for the law by virtue of them, are labeled false notions.,
To Radin, it is curious that most of the statements of law about actual
experience do not get into books.9 The idea is, perhaps, not new. The
modern emphasis upon administration, dating -from Ihering, may readily
account for that fact. Doubtless, it was that fact which, years ago, made
Pound's exposition of Law in Books and Law in Action' ° a classic revelation.
However, Radin's exposition is characteristically penetrating and resourceful.
Indeed, it is the field in which the realists have reveled.
But when Radin pays tribute to the logical technique of the mediaeval
schoolman," x who sifted, arranged and systematized, he stands on sounder2
ground than some of the exponents of realistic movement in law have stood.1
That "any other method breaks down under its own weight" seems amply
to justify his position.
What is the goal of the law? How are negligence cases which arise from
automobile accidents handled in the law,' 3 where our interest is still in the
source of the accident? In Workmen's Compensation, the question is not
"How was the injury produced?" but "How may it be repaired?"' 4 What
is the task of the lawyer and what is the sphere of the penologist so far
as the criminal law is concerned? 15 Should the lawyer be an economist?",
These are some of the problems to which Radin directs his attention.
The goal of the law is, according to Ihering, 17 "the means of securing the
conditions of life in the community." In the first instance that purpose
looks to experience rather than to logic;18 it is a social ideal. The end of
law is always ideal. An ideal is given not by logic nor by experience but
by moral conviction. 19 It involves rational processes indulged in with the
hope of a real experience. The cynic would say that is "wishful thinking"
but if the thinking is based upon adequate experience it scarcely merits condemnation even by a realist. It is merely evidence, as Holmes said, that
"Every opinion tends to become law." 20 Just now we are aware that idealism
springs eternal in the breasts of men, when the forces of economics challenge. It is not in the field of legislatibn alone that we are made aware
of that fact; we must remember that judicial New Dealism unseated doctrinaire conservatism.
8p. 35.
OP. 37.
'OPound, Law in Books and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am%.L. REv. 12.
"P.
45.
12Aronson speaks of "the stormy petrels of so-called neo-realism" whose direction

"leads to the ultimate conclusion that there is no such thing at all as a body of legal

principles, but only individual judgments in each case, and evaporating with the breath
of the judge as he pronounces the decision." Aronson, Cardozo's Doctrine of Sociological Jurisprudewce (1938) 4 J. Soc. PHrL. 5, 29.
13p. 69.
14p. 71.
15P. 101.
16P. 134.
17P. 142.
18Ibid.
19p.
143.
2
OLochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
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Whatever else justice may turn out to be, it is a social ideal.21 Radin
says "To secure a good society, whether it is good because it is characterized
by an abstractly derived justice or by an ideal taken from experience, cannot
be the purpose of law for the simple reason that it is the purpose of the
entire mechanism of political and social organization." 22 The reader may
well ask himself, if law, politics and sociology are all social sciences, why
may not the purpose of all be deemed to be the purpose of each, even though
they may be interrelated parts of a social complex. Even though one may
admit that commercial convenience, appeasement of litigants and promotion
of good will are the purpose of law in actual operation,2 that admission
does not preclude those ends being subsumed under a social ideal of a law
that conditions the life of the community.
"What is justice?" is the age-old problem with which iRadin concludes
this little volume. Even as mathematically conceived in primitive society, it
served as a guaranty of peace and stability.2 4 If justice is the end of law,
to many a lawyer, the achievement of the end is said to be a little doubtful.2
Since law, like life, is a process, even a lawyer needs insight to discover if
equity, or
any valid basis for such doubt, as Radin suggests, exists. Still,
26
In the last
justice, does enter the law, although sometimes surreptitiously.
27
analysis, justice is what judges in general think is just.

Radin concludes that the law is a technique,2 8 which cannot dispense with
either logic or experience. To him "Humanity is, after all, the business of
the law."'29 Since logic is a technique and experience is not, to some realists
at least it will appear that if the business of the law is humanity it is something more than a technique.30 Its technique alone probably does not distinguish it from some other sciences.
Some realists doubt that justice vitally pulsates as a factor in law. Contrast the attitude of the two outstanding realists, Radin and Llewellyn.
Llewellyn implores: "Let us forget 'right reason'; let us forget the bastard
something known as morality; let us acknowledge merely the obvious fact
in law, that law as is, is law. Justice may be an ideal; in actuality it is an
accident. A legal system exists to preserve the law as 'is, and any other thinkfrom the facts of life." 31
ing is a somewhat idealistic- tendency, divorced
Perry seems to clarify the controverted point.3 2 "The nature of the world
is judged by fact rather than ideals. .
21p. 144.
22P. 145.
23P. 146.
24p. 149.
25p. 153.
26p. 154.
27p. 158.
28p.
29p.
30

163.

.

. The degree of its goodness is a

164.
"Yet the ethical element is there, not in the terminology, indeed, but in the body of
authoritative materials, in the form of a definite body of received ideals, as well established
and quite as efficacious in the results in the judicial decisions as the precepts." Pound,
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law (1933) 7 TULANE L.
REv.1 475, 477.
S
Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 205, 208.
32
pray, PHILOSOPHY OF THE RECENT PAST (1926) 220.
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question of experience, or of faith translated into endeavor." The difference
between Radin and Llewellyn as realists must be either one of experience
or one of faith.. Clearly, speculation uncontrolled by fact may lose touch
with reality.. Yet there must be something in the law as is which was not in
the law as was, otherwise legal justice and social justice would not have been
so sharply differentiated as they have been in recent years.3 Probably
Radin differs from Llewellyn not so much in his technique as in the social
range from which he draws his materials. That difference is not formal;
it is substantial. The perspective of Holmes was more likely the result of
his vision rather
than of his technique, however significant his technique
34
may have been
The year of 1940 has contributed greatly to enrich the field of legal
thought. In it have appeared three notable critiques of current legal theory:
Radin's Law as Logic and Experience, Fuller's The Law in Quest of Itself
and Pound's Contemporary Juristic Theory. They represent not only a high
level of performance but they also demonstrate the value of the lecture
foundation as a stimulus to legal thought.
Herbert D. Laube.*
Ithaca, New York.

Law, the State, and the International Community. By JAMEs BROWN
ScorT. New York: Columbia University Press. 1939. Two volumes.
Pp. xxiv, 613; vi, 401.
Dr. James Brown Scott, formerly Solicitor of the Department of State,
presents in these two volumes a detailed examination of fundamental principles of our legal, political and international ideals. Volume I contains
a history of relevant political thought, legal philosophy, and international
law. Volume II consists of excerpts largely from the sources discussed in
the first volume but grouped ideologically rather than chronologically under
the three main headings of Jurisprudence, The State, and The Law of
Nations. The second volume is described by Dr. Scott as a codification of
the various selected authorities on the subject-matter. Both volumes begin
with fifth-century B.C. Greece and end substantially with the first quarter
of the seventeenth century of our era.
Thus, after presenting in an introductory chapter largely his own views
supported by quotations from modern sources, Dr. Scott launches into the
subject-matter with The Greek Background (ch. II-VI) in which he sets
the social and political stage for a description of the lives and an analysis
of the theories of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The section
serves also as a broader background for the next three chapters (ch. VII-IX)
33

Dewey has said that realism may easily become "a sanction of legal formalism in
CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE: THE NEmD FOR A RE-

behalf of things as they are." DEWEY,
coVERY or PHILosopHY (1917) 68.

SMorris Cohen has often spoken of the absurdity of trying "to build a house with
nothing but the rules of architecture." Cohen, Law and Scientific Method (1927) 6
Am. L ScHoOL REv. 231, 237.
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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under the heading The Roman Heritage since, as Dr. Scott observes, much
of the content of Rome's ius gentium stems from Greek sources and since
Greek philosophical doctrine, particularly that of the Stoics, facilitated the
identification of ius gentium with natural law. The Roman section is, on
the whole, devoted to a description and analysis'of two identifications, that
of Roman civil law with ius gentiunz and of ius gentium with natural law,
accomplished by Rome's legal genius and leading to positive legal, rather
than purely ethical or moral, conceptions of universal and of international
law respectively. Cicero's and Seneca's contributions are specially noted
here. The third section's seven chapters (X-XVI) continue this description
and analysis of the development of political and legal ideas-of law into an
universal or international law and of the state into a cosmopolitan society.
Here The Christian Heritage, Ancient and Medieval from Greek and Roman
sources is correlated to Hebrew and Christian ideals and its further evolution traced through St. Augustine, Isidore of Seville, John of Salisbury, St.
Thomas Aquinas, Dante Alighieri, and others, to The Church as an Institution in relation to law and politics down to the middle of the fifteenth
century after Christ. Of significance for the history of international law
here is Dr. Scott's restatement of the view that St. Augustine already
suggested a definition of "just" war according to its cause, which implies
a condemnation of wars of aggression as well as of international criminals
(cf. p. 192 f.), and that it was Isidore of Seville who first described ius
gentium in terms of a modem international law (p. 202).
So far Dr. Scott's survey implies continuance and steady progress in the
history of ideas and of humankind. But in The Transition from Medieval to
Modern Thought (ch. XVII-XXVI), which resulted partially in such disruptive theories as that of Machiavelli in relation to statecraft or that of Bodin
with regard to the sovereign state, Dr. Scott's theory of "progress" in the
history of ideas on law, the state, and the international community encounters
difficulties. These obstacles "to the normal growth of political ideals from
their historical bases" (p. 341) are, however, in Dr. Scott's view, naught
but "aberrations which at one time or another threatened to impede" the
symmetrical growth of legal and political theory as embodying moral conceptions of justice, equity, right and liberty (p. 278). For this reason no
extracts from The Prince or the Six Books of the Republic have been included in volume II (cf. p. 278 and n. 2), which seems therefore intended
to codify a law of progress in poltical and legal thought. Whether or not
this represents an injustice to Machiavelli or Bodin the reviewer makes no
attempt to decide. The reader may, however, find solace in the implication
that in the theories of Vitoria, designated as the real father of international
law, of Marsiglio, Castiglione, St. Germain, Ayala, Gentili, and others, the
law of progress took its course. Next The Era of Reform (ch. XXVIIXXX) is ushered in with More's Utopia, with Calvin's and Luther's theories
of the relation of the church to law and to the state, and with the discussion
of church reform as reflected, inter alia, in Erasmus' humanistic Praise of
Folly. In The Beginning of the Modern Age (ch. XXXI-XXXIV) Dr.
Scott concludes his survey of the political, legal, and international ideals
fundamental to our period as outlined by Grotius in his Mare Liberum, and
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as presented in Cardinal Bellarmine's, Suarez', and Hooker's theories. An
Epilogue (ch. XXXV) summarizes the development traced in the volume,
comments briefly on subsequent developments in the writings of John Locke,
Edmund Burke and John Ruskin, and emphasizes an eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism, individualism and ldissez-faire.
It might, of course, be contended that most of our modem ideals on
law, the state, and the international community bad been formulated and
stated before the advent of the middle of the seventeenth century of our
era and that therefore subsequent thinkers merely restated fundamentals in
their application to a particular situation. On this basis Dr. Scott's survey is
adequate in its historical span. But if historical exclusion or inclusion is
governed by such considerations then such theories as, for instance, Cicero's
restatement of Stoic doctrine might be ommitted as much as Bellarmine or
Hooker. Such is, however, not the case. Hence Dr. Scott's survey might
be profitably expanded to include the period between 1648 and 1940 since,
it is submitted, these centuries furnished as much of our modern heritage
of political, legal and international ideals and ideas as did those preceding
them. The author's brief introductory chapter does not adequately treat
the last four centuries which contain names such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel, Martens, Moser, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Bluntschli, Bosanquet, Wheaton, Westlake, Jhering, Stammler, Triepel, Duguit, Krabbe,
Kelsen-to mention but a few of those who have made significant contributions to recent political, legal and international thought. It may, moreover,
be questioned whether our ideas of the state, of law and international law,
and of the international community bear as much semblance to the fundamentals expounded by the ancients, the middle ages, and the transitional
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as they do to the ideas of the less distant
past. Dr. Scott's survey would be materially enhanced by the addition of
a third and fourth volume devoted this period.
Dr. Scott's presentation of the subject-matter bears the distinct imprint of
his person-his values and his ideals. The selection and interpretation of
materials seems governed by a belief that history reveals a slow and painful
ascent of humankind accomplished by a series of advances and retreats but
steadily pushing forward. That belief' accounts for the treatment meted
out to Machiavelli and Bodin and, perhaps, for the omission of the last
four centuries. Whether or not history reveals such a law of progress is,
however, a matter of dispute. But surely forces, factors, and ideas disruptive of such progress are as much part of history, both actual and ideal,
as those facts and ideas which harmonize with personal values, judgments,
and ideals. Dr. Scott's values and ideals-his view of law as a constructive
force in society embodying legal, ethical and religious ideas and ideals, of
the state as a social institution for the attainment of the good life and as
a legal construct identical with law, of international law as in nature essentially the same as municipal law and regulating but the conduct of the agents
of the state, and of the international community as a community of indidividuals rather than abstract states-are, in a sense, realistic and surely
commendable. But they represent only one strain of thought in the long
history of political, legal and international ideas. Recent theory, moreover,
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inclines more toward empiricism and realism in political and philosophical
theory, toward a positivism in law and international law, and toward the
discovery of socio-natural laws as opposed to a natural law in social relations.
The value of Dr. Scott's present work lies in its emphasis on ideals, such
as an ideal justice embodied in an ideal natural law, which may serve as
criteria of actual political and legal behavior and institutions as much as of
positive law and international legal relations. Perhaps no society can intelligently guide itself without such ideals as factors of rational control and
as social ends. Iti this sense Dr. Scott's survey is a valuable contribution
to the literature on law, the state and the international community. For
the same reason, however, it does not present all those possible solutions
to legal, political and international problems transmitted to us by the past.
George Manner.*
Urbana, Illinois.
Bankruptcy and Reorganization. By ARTHUR W.
lyn: Harmon Publications. 1940. Pp. xli, 560.

SELVERSTONE.

Brook-

"When Britain really ruled the waves(In good Queen Bess's time)
The House of Peers made no pretense
To intellectual eminence,
Or scholarship sublime;
Yet Britain won her proudest bays
In good Queen Bess's glorious days !"
In reviewing this one volume work, I am sorely tempted to quote the above
song of Lord Mountararat from the second act of "Iolanthe and leave the
matter there.
Gilbert and Sullivan, as usual, have said all I can say and said it "very
well."
The style of this book is the same as the invaluable Richardson on Evide~nce and the present volume is dedicated to Dean Richardson.
The author sets forth in good clear English the provisions of the act and
refers to a great many leading decisions.
No attempt is made at criticism or analysis of these decisions or of the
various provisions in the amended act that at present excite those of us whose
job it is to study them.
The author in his preface frankly states that the book is designed to present "the materials of the subject in compact form" and expresses the hope
that "this type of presentation should prove of particular value to the law
student, the accountant and the business man. To this end, the book has
been written."
Granted that the author's approach is the right one, it is difficult to understand why there is no reference to the many intellectually stimulating articles
*Instructor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
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in the legal periodicals. The Table of Authorities (p. xli) refers to but
three articles in legal periodicals (two by the author himself and one by
Duberstein in the Federal Law Journal of June, 1939).
It is hoped that the author in future editions will remedy this inexcusable
defect.
There is no denying, however, that the book is of value to the practicing
lawyer and law student. In the first place, any book that reduces a presentation of even the non-controversial material in this field to 313 pages
deserves a place on your library shelf. In thd second place, .both the practicing lawyer and the law student can.'profitably read a short book that
presents fundamentals.
As Harold R. Medina recently said in reviewing. Sealy on Torts,
"At a time when law books seemed [sic] to be growing in size by
leaps and bounds, while at the same time taking on the aspect of a mere
succession of case digests, it is refreshing to find, a modem work ...
sufficiently small in size to make one feel that it can be read from cover.
to cover."'
Arthur John Keeffe*
Ithaca, New York.
1(1939) BRooF.LYx L. Rzv. 100.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

